More information about this CVE will likely be available in a few days
Description
CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.
Related CPE's
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References
Weaknesses
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
CVSS impact metrics
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Information
Source identifier
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
Vulnerability status
Deferred
Published
2026-10-30T13:18:31.647Z
5 hours agoLast modified
2026-10-30T17:08:54.633Z
1 hour ago